Forced termination of minority shareholders' participation in a joint-stock company by Hladík, Vlastimil
Abstract 
 
Forced Termination of Minority Shareholders‘ Participation in a Joint Stock Company 
 
The diploma thesis deals with legal regulation of a phenomenon generally known as 
squeeze-out, introduction of which into the Czech legal order is still by many regarded highly 
controversial. The respective legal institute is subject to analysis from the standpoint of its 
economic determination. 
The thesis itself is divided into three chapters: the first chapter provides an economic 
basis for permitting squeeze-out as a legitimate means of increasing efficiency of a joint-stock 
company. In brief the reasons can be characterized as extra expenditures originating in the 
presence of minority shareholders in the company, some of which have the nature of 
opportunity costs. However, the thesis further shows that the minority shareholders are not 
economically motivated to transfer their shares on the majority shareholder, mainly due to the 
free-rider problem. Squeeze-out then represents an efficient means of rationalizing the 
relations among shareholders within a joint stock company. 
The second chapter is devoted to constitutional protection of property and its relation 
to forced cession of minority shareholders’ shares in case of squeeze-out. The European Court 
of Justice as well as the Czech Constitutional Court held in their constant case law that the 
particular situation in a joint stock company under which squeeze-out is possible can be 
described as a collision of property law of the majority shareholder on one hand and minority 
shareholders on the other. As minority shareholders clearly represent an unjustifiable burden 
for the company –and in the very result for the majority shareholder, who bears most of the 
investment risk – the right of the majority shareholder must prevail. General relevance of this 
conclusion is then challenged by comparison with case law of the Constitutional Court of 
Georgia who ruled that the introduction of squeeze-out into Georgian legislature is contrary to 
Constitution as the interest in protection of minority shareholders within the conditions of 
Georgian post-transformational economy outweighs the interest of majority shareholders to 
streamline their business companies. 
Finally chapter three explores the effective Czech legal regulation of squeeze-out. The 
reasonable scope of majority which should be associated with the right to squeeze-out 
minority shareholders is put in question. Moreover, inadequacies in legal regulation leading to 
failure to successfully squeeze-out all minority shareholders are stated in respect to several 
special scenarios. The last part examines the legal term “adequate compensation” to squeezed-
out minority shareholders, which should assure that the economic position of minority 
shareholders does not deteriorate. However, this is apparently not always true as empirical 
investigation clearly shows. As a possible cause the expert opinion, which is utilized in the 
process of ascertaining the adequate compensation, is closely inspected. It is held that the 
adequate compensation must be construed as a question of law rather than question of fact due 
to principal impossibility of its exact determination through an unbiased expert opinion. As 
the Czech statute law nor the case law does not provide for more detailed regulation or 
guidance the role of a court in particular cases is seen as crucial. On the other hand the 
position of minority shareholders in the proceeding concerning judicial review of the adequate 
compensation improved dramatically due to the new approach adopted by the Supreme Court 
of the Czech Republic in recent case law. 
 
